MILKOVICH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/26/2018 4:57 PM

ELECTORAL DUE PROCESS
SARAH MILKOVICH†
ABSTRACT
Elections and their aftermath are matters left to the states by the U.S.
Constitution. But the Supreme Court has made clear that the right to
vote is federally protected, and fiercely so. When an election failure
takes place and deprives citizens of their votes, challengers must resort
to state law remedies. Many states have procedural requirements for
election challenges that are stringent to the point of being prohibitive.
This Note argues that the due process concerns raised by these
burdensome state procedures are amplified by their voting rights
context. Where a voter must take to the courts to vindicate her right to
vote, she should not be further deprived by an unfair process. Federal
courts hearing cases about unfair election-challenge procedures have
been reluctant to interfere and are thus overly deferential to the states.
This Note offers a new approach for “electoral due process”
claims—an approach that is properly preservative of voters’
substantive rights and their rights to a fair hearing.
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At the bottom of all the tributes paid to democracy, is the little
man, walking into the little booth, with a little pencil, making a
little cross on a little bit of paper—no amount of rhetoric or
voluminous discussion can possibly palliate the overwhelming
importance of that point.
— Winston Churchill1
INTRODUCTION
The 2000 presidential election left Americans reeling and
uncertain about the integrity of the electoral system. Congress quickly
passed the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”).2 In response to the
hanging chads that loomed large in the national psyche,3 a federal
solution was presented—federal money was made available to state
and local governments for election administration updates like
electronic voting machines.4 HAVA funds and updates were accepted
by all fifty states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.5

1. 404 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1944) col. 667 (UK).
2. Help America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
3. Senator Kit Bond described the effect the 2000 presidential election had on the nation:
The 2000 election opened the eyes of many Americans to the flaws and failures of our
election machinery, our voting systems, and even how we determine what a vote is . . . .
We learned of hanging chads and inactive lists. . . . We learned of legal voters turned
away, while dead voters cast ballots. We discovered that many people voted twice,
while too many weren’t even counted once . . . . This . . . bill . . . tries to address each of
the fundamental problems we have discovered.
148 CONG. REC. S10,488–02 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2002) (statement of Sen. Bond).
4. See 52 U.S.C. § 20901(a), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(F) (2012) (providing funding for “educating
voters concerning . . . voting technology” and “[i]mproving, acquiring, . . . or replacing voting
systems and technology and methods for casting and counting votes”). Crafting HAVA was a
delicate matter because the Constitution leaves the “[m]anner of holding Elections” to the states.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. This plenary grant of power to the states restricts meddling by the
federal government. Congress may condition federal funds on state performance of objectives
that are not within Congress’s enumerated powers, as long as those objectives are “in pursuit of
the general welfare,” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (internal quotation marks
omitted), and the offered funds do not operate as a compulsion, id. at 211. HAVA is an allowed
vehicle for Congress to use to facilitate election technology updates because the offered federal
funds—and the attached election administration changes—were voluntary for the states. See
Jennifer Nou, Privatizing Democracy: Promoting Election Integrity Through Procurement
Contracts, 118 YALE L.J. 744, 781–82 (“Under the Spending Clause, conditional grants like
HAVA merely create incentives rather than coercive pronouncements for states and thus do not
constitute unconstitutional intrusions into state sovereignty.”).
5. See U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ANNUAL GRANT EXPENDITURE REPORT:
FISCAL YEAR 2015, at 2 (Mar. 2016), https://www.eac.gov/assets/1/28/Final%20FY%202015
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During the 2016 election, all states but three used electronic voting
machines.6 Every state also now uses electronic voter-registration
databases, which are accessed on Election Day to verify the eligibility
of each voter who comes to the polls.7 These updates work to prevent
the election failures of an earlier era—those of faulty hole punching, of
eligible voters turned away by poll workers, and of accidental over- or
undervoting.8
During the 2016 election cycle, however, this new technology
fomented a new breed of concerns: tampered-with electronic voting
machines; the inadvertent misprogramming of electronic voting
machine software; and remote interference with voter registration
databases.9 Hackers working from Russia “hit” the electronic election
systems in thirty-nine states during the 2016 primaries and general
election.10 At least “a handful of states” experienced interference with
election administration during this cybersecurity attack, but there is
very little information about the extent to which these hits impacted
Election Day.11 In July 2018, Special Counsel Robert Mueller secured

%20Grants%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT4B-LWAL] (reporting that as of September 30,
2015, $3,247,294,645 has been given to these jurisdictions under HAVA).
6. See Drew Desilver, On Election Day, Most Voters Use Electronic or Optical-Scan Ballots,
PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/11/08/on-election-daymost-voters-use-electronic-or-optical-scan-ballots/ [https://perma.cc/6H4U-6LZ9] (reporting that
Washington, Oregon, and Colorado conduct all voting by mail, while the other forty-seven states
use at least some optical-scan voting and direct-recording electronic voting machines).
7. See VRM in the States: Electronic Registration, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Feb. 3,
2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/vrm-states-electronic-registration [https://
perma.cc/V67R-R2JM] (“Thanks to . . . the Help America Vote Act, every state now has (or soon
will have) a computerized statewide voter registration database capable of sharing information in
some form with other government databases.”).
8. See 148 CONG. REC. S10,488–02, supra note 3 (referring to these election problems as
the motivation for HAVA).
9. See, e.g., Brian Barrett, America’s Electronic Voting Machines are Scarily Easy Targets,
WIRED (Aug. 2, 2016, 9:57 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/08/americas-voting-machinesarent-ready-election/ [https://perma.cc/8E7J-PM25] (“[R]esearchers have demonstrated that
many [electronic voting systems] are susceptible to malware or, equally if not more alarming, a
well-timed denial of service attack.”).
10. Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, Russian Cyber Hacks on U.S. Electoral System Far
Wider than Previously Known, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-06-13/russian-breach-of-39-states-threatens-future-u-selections [https://perma.cc/2QAT-B4E5].
11. See Sari Horwitz, Ellen Nakashima & Matea Gold, DHS Tells States About Russian
Hacking During 2016 Election, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/dhs-tells-states-about-russian-hacking-during-2016-election/2017/09/22/
fd263a2c-9fe2-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html [https://perma.cc/G5FX-6FYQ] (reporting
that “the hackers seemed to be looking for vulnerabilities”).

MILKOVICH IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

11/26/2018 4:57 PM

598

[Vol. 68:595

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

indictments against twelve Russian intelligence agents for charges
related to “large-scale cyber operations [conducted] to interfere with
the 2016 U.S. presidential election.”12 The 2017 French presidential
election also suffered an “infrastructure” attack from Russian
hackers.13 And the 20018 midterm elections were no different. By the
end of Election Day, civil rights organizations had reported at least
29,000 voting irregularities across the country.14 In Georgia, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Texas, machines are said to have flipped
voters’ choices.15 In New York City, so many voting machines began
malfunctioning that one organization created a map of affected polling
places.16 In one Georgia county, five different polling places
experienced voting machine failure; remaining voters used provisional
ballots, but it is not yet clear whether votes cast on those machines
earlier in the day were preserved.17
12. Indictment, United States v. Netyksho, No. 1:18CR00215, 2018 WL 3407381 (D.D.C. July
13, 2018).
13. See Andy Greenberg, The NSA Confirms It: Russia Hacked French Election
‘Infrastructure’, WIRED (May 9, 2017, 12:36 PM), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/nsa-directorconfirms-russia-hacked-french-election-infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/K4WS-4HWH]
(reporting that the nature of the “infrastructure” attack has not been clearly revealed by the
French government, but that the En Marche political party has described the attack as “a massive,
coordinated act of hacking”).
14. Amy Gardner & Beth Reinhard, Broken Machines, Rejected Ballots and Long Lines:
Voting Problems Emerge as Americans Go to the Polls, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/broken-machines-rejected-ballots-and-long-linesvoting-problems-emerge-as-americans-go-to-the-polls/2018/11/06/ffd11e52-dfa8-11e8-b3f062607289efee_story.html [https://perma.cc/377X-SQWJ].
15. See id. (“Complaints also emerged about voting machines flipping voters’ choices in
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Texas and Illinois.”); John Bowden, Voters Report Texas Voting
Machines Changing Straight-Party Selections, HILL (Oct. 26, 2018, 11:27 AM),
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/413320-voters-report-texas-voting-machines-changingstraight-party-selections [https://perma.cc/CE2Z-BPZ9] (reporting this problem in Texas and
Georgia).
16. Courtney Norris, Nsikan Akpan & Joshua Barajas, Which States Were Hit by Voting
Problems on Election Day?, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 6, 218, 6:44 PM),
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/which-states-were-hit-by-voting-problems-on-electionday [https://perma.cc/B7MB-W7U3] (reporting voting machine problems in New York City and
including a link to the map showing voting machine outages). The map represents each voting
machine failure as a dot. Erica Anderson, NYCity News Serv., Jenny Ye, Quartz, Spenser Metsel,
Ally J. Levine & Sisi Wei, ProPublica, Breakdown in New York City, PROPUBLICA:
ELECTIONLAND (Nov. 8, 2018, 10:300 AM), https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/election2018-broken-machines [https://perma.cc/543L-SUVV].
17. Gardner & Reinhard, supra note 14. All of this is to say nothing of the fact that Georgia
Secretary of State Brian Kemp administered the very election in which he was running for
governor; Kemp’s administration of the election, including an eleventh-hour “investigation”
launched into Georgia Democrats, which suggested “without evidence” that they “tr[ied] to hack
the state’s voter registration files,” has been the subject of significant criticism. Richard Fausset
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These recent breaches have claimed the spotlight, but postHAVA election failures are not new. In 2008, electronic voting
machines were improperly programmed for the congressional primary
in Louisiana.18 At least 2167—and likely 5000—independent voters
were prevented from casting Democratic votes, even though they were
explicitly allowed to do so by state law.19 The margin in that primary
was 1484 votes.20 In 2012, at least one polling station in Virginia had an
electronic voting machine with faulty programming.21 The machine had
to be decommissioned on Election Day because votes cast for
President Barack Obama were being tallied for Governor Mitt
Romney.22 Virginia experienced election failures again during the 2014
midterm elections, when “thirty-two electronic voting machines at
twenty-five polling places” stopped functioning properly.23 The entire
Texas voter-registration system crashed during the 2014 midterm
& Alan Blinder, Brian Kemp’s Office, Without Citing Evidence, Investigates Georgia Democrats
Over Alleged Hack, N.Y. Times (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/04/us/politics/
georgia-elections-kemp-voters-hack.html [https://perma.cc/LW8H-9Z8F]; Nicquel Terry Ellis,
Will Georgia Voting Controversies Discourage Voters from Turning Out?, USA TODAY (Nov. 2,
2018, 11:27 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/02/midtermsstacey-abrams-brian-kemp-voter-suppression-controversy-minority-turnout/18007527002
[https://perma.cc/7BLA-FYS8].
18. See Andrew Appel, Independent Voters Disenfranchised in Louisiana, FREEDOM TO
TINKER (Oct. 19, 2008), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2008/10/19/independent-votersdisenfranchised-louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/F3UK-VDXD] (“[W]hen Independent voters
pressed the button on the voting machine for a candidate in the Democratic congressional
primary, nothing happened. In effect, these voters said that they were prevented from voting in
the Democratic Congressional primary.”). My father was a candidate in this race, and I worked
on his campaign. He unsuccessfully filed suit to challenge the election on the basis of the
electronic voting machine irregularities.
19. See id. (reporting that the Sequoia AVC Advantage version 9.00H direct-recording
electronic voting machines used in the election improperly “locked out” independent voters,
preventing them from casting a ballot).
20. Id.
21. See James Orr, US Election 2012: Voting Machine “Changes Vote for Barack Obama to
Mitt Romney,” TELEGRAPH (Nov. 6, 2012, 9:05 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/us-election/9659694/US-election-2012-voting-machine-changes-vote-forBarack-Obama-to-Mitt-Romney.html [https://perma.cc/GJ7F-7YPT] (“An electronic voting
machine was taken out of service on Tuesday after being captured on video changing a vote for
President Barack Obama into one for Mitt Romney.”).
22. Id. Similar vote flipping was reported in 2012 for electronic voting machines in Nevada,
Texas, North Carolina, and Ohio. Mark Clayton, Voting-Machine Glitches: How Bad Was It on
Election Day Around the Country?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 7, 2012),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Elections/2012/1107/Voting-machine-glitches-How-bad-was-iton-Election-Day-around-the-country [https://perma.cc/PWE2-KT8E].
23. Pippa Norris, Why American Elections are Flawed (And How to Fix Them) 9 (Harvard
Kennedy Sch., Working Paper No. RWP16-038, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2844793
[https://perma.cc/WT9X-HZPT].
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election, forcing many to choose between forfeiting their vote
altogether and taking the extra time to cast a provisional ballot.24
Computer science professors at Princeton, Johns Hopkins, U.C.
Berkeley, U.C. Davis, and the University of Michigan have attested to
the ease with which they—or any programmer—could tamper with
voting machine software.25 One boasted a personal best of complete
software reprogramming in under a minute.26
How is this new generation of election threats to be addressed?
More federal funding could encourage states to opt for newer
technology. It seems, however, that no security measure could
completely prevent meddling. In 2017 alone, even the best-protected
organizations, from the NSA and the CIA to Deloitte and Merck, were
brought to their knees.27 If even the entities with the very best
cybersecurity are suffering breaches, the same should be expected in
the election process. In a time of such sophisticated threats to the
integrity of our electoral process, preventive measures alone are not
enough. Congressional researchers released a report in 2016 that

24. Id. (citation omitted).
25. See David L. Dill, Our Voting System Is Hackable by Foreign Powers, SCI. AM. (Mar. 1,
2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/our-voting-system-is-hackable-by-foreignpowers/ [https://perma.cc/BK82-6C2X] (“[P]rofessor J. Alex Halderman says that he and his
students could have changed the result of the November [2016] election . . . and there are videos
to prove it.”); Andrea Foster, Computer Scientists Hack into Voting Machines, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC.: WIRED CAMPUS (July 30, 2007), https://www.chronicle.com/blogs/wiredcampus/
computer-scientists-hack-into-voting-machines/3217 [https://perma.cc/PDB2-LFY8] (reporting
that in a study commissioned by the California Secretary of State, the U.C. professors “hack[ed]
into electronic voting machines from three manufacturers”); Daniel Turner, How to Hack an
Election in One Minute, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 18, 2006), https://www.technologyreview.com/
s/406525/how-to-hack-an-election-in-one-minute/ [https://perma.cc/NV5N-6FFF] (reporting that
with “$12 worth of tools,” the team “show[ed] exactly how entire voting systems could be not just
rendered inoperable, but deliberately hacked to rig an election”).
26. See Chris Newmarker, Princeton Prof Hacks E-Vote Machine, WASH. POST (Sept.
13, 2006, 6:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/07/13/
AR2006071300989.html [https://perma.cc/BRN9-A52U] (“One member of the group was able to
pick the lock in 10 seconds, and software could be installed in less than a minute . . . .”).
27. See Lily Hay Newman, The Biggest Cybersecurity Disasters of 2017 So Far, WIRED (July
1, 2017, 10:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/2017-biggest-hacks-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/
99DS-QW7q] (reporting the breaches suffered by the NSA, the United Kingdom’s National
Health Service, U.S. pharmaceutical giant Merck, and the CIA’s “Vault 7” data trove); Zack
Whittaker, These Were 2017’s Biggest Hacks, Leaks, and Data Breaches, ZDNET (Dec. 18, 2017,
8:21 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/pictures/biggest-hacks-leaks-and-data-breaches-2017/ [https://
perma.cc/SSG6-FPWD] (reporting the breaches suffered by the TSA; the U.S. Air Force;
Deloitte, one of the “Big Four” accounting, tax, and audit corporations; Verizon; Equifax; Bell
Canada, Canada’s largest telecommunications company; Virgin America; Oxford University;
Cambridge University; and New York University).
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stated, “Cybersecurity experts [recognize] that preventive measures
are insufficient by themselves” to prevent a cyberattack on American
elections because “an adversary with enough motivation, resources,
and expertise, such as a nation-state, can often overcome” such security
measures.28 What is required, then, is a new remedial framework.
Remedies for election failures are a matter of state law. Just as
Election Day policies and voter registration processes are left to the
states,29 so too are the procedures for challenging election practices and
election results.30 Each state has its own guidelines for alleging that an
election was defective or wanting in some way, for investigating the
election structure and results, and for remedying any identified error.31
While each state has developed a unique election-challenge process,32
the majority are structured to restrict the number of challenges, to
impose short timelines on election challengers, and to minimize the
number of challenges that ultimately succeed.33 These measures serve
the admittedly important state interest of having a settled victor take
office in time—a victor untainted by doubts in the process by which she
was selected.34 However, at a certain point, such procedures burden

28. ARTHUR L. BURRIS & ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE HELP
AMERICA VOTE ACT AND ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES
FOR THE 2016 ELECTION 17 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20898.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6ECK-PLQN].
29. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding elections . . .
shall be prescribed in each State . . . .”). Only boundaries set by other provisions of the
Constitution can limit the states’ garde of elections. The Fifteenth Amendment, for instance,
provides that neither race nor color nor “previous condition of servitude” may be used to deny
or abridge a citizen’s right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The Supreme Court also
explained, “States may not casually deprive a class of individuals of the vote because of some
remote administrative benefit to the State.” Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). Such a
deprivation, the Court said, would “impose[] an invidious discrimination in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
30. See Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978) (“[T]he Constitution confers
upon the states the ‘power to control the disposition of contests over elections to . . . state and
local offices.’” (citation omitted)).
31. See infra Part I.
32. These election challenges are often referred to as “election contests” in state statutes,
case law, and scholarship.
33. See infra Part I.
34. See, e.g., Joshua A. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1015,
1024 (2013) (“The system craves finality, particularly on election night . . . . A contested election
undermines the notion that the winner has an electoral mandate.”) [hereinafter Douglas,
Discouraging Election Contests].
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voters’35 constitutional rights.36 Federal courts have, at times, stepped
in to require states to adjust their challenge procedures to be less
burdensome on challengers. The standard for reviewing these
procedures, however, has been deferential to the states, and rare has
been the successful challenge.37
This Note argues that state procedural rules should be reformed
to allow litigants to more easily discover the extent of election failures
and to prove their impact on election outcomes. Federal courts should
propel these changes by adopting more exacting legal standards for
“electoral due process” claims—that is, claims that involve the
sufficiency and fairness of procedures for challenging elections. By
demanding more from these state procedural frameworks, federal
courts could protect our uniquely decentralized American electoral
process38 from the impact of modern threats and protect the
constitutional rights of voters—all with minimal federal judicial
encroachment into the “political thicket.”39
Part I of this Note provides an overview of states’ procedural
frameworks for challenging elections. Part II lays out a brief history of
federal courts’ treatment of election questions, highlighting the
uniqueness and centrality of the right to vote. Part III proposes a new
approach for electoral due process cases. This approach would demand
more of state procedures for election challenges—a change that is
newly imperative in an age of unprecedented election interference
threats.
I. SURVEY OF STATE PROCEDURES FOR ELECTION CHALLENGES
States require much of litigants who wish to challenge election
results. Short deadlines, expensive filing fees, and summary
proceedings make it more difficult for challengers to be heard on the
35. This Note discusses the rights of voters, but the rights of candidates are conceptually the
same in this context. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972) (“The rights of voters and the
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always
have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.”).
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, supra note 34, at 1017 (“[T]here have been no
successful election contests for federal office (either House of Congress or President) or governor
in recent memory.” (citations omitted)).
38. See Norris, supra note 23, at 7 (referring to the “decentralized nature of [the] US electoral
administration” in which there are 8000 separate jurisdictions responsible for election
administration and security).
39. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1123 (2016) (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S.
549, 556 (1946)).
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merits of their claims—and much more difficult for them to succeed.
Some scholars urge states to impose additional burdens. For example,
sore-loser laws would punish candidates who challenge results “by
restricting their future ballot access or giving these candidates a
disfavored ballot placement in a subsequent election,” or by
“requir[ing] that the candidate’s advertisements in the next election
include a disclaimer.”40
In addition to these procedural burdens, which are discussed more
fully below, some states hinder litigants from even learning about
election failures. For instance, “standard operating procedures” in
Georgia led state workers to wipe electronic voting machine data from
servers in 2017, just after the filing of a lawsuit that concerned the
machines’ poor performance.41 Though policies like these are not
formal rules, they impact a challenger’s ability to gather evidence that
is crucial for making a case about election failures.
No matter the improbability of navigating these rules, a litigant
cannot completely evade eccentric challenge procedures by instead
filing suit in federal court.42 Concerns over election administration, as
a matter left to the states, must first be adjudicated according to stateprovided procedural vehicles. Only once available state remedies are
exhausted may a litigant raise constitutional election-failure claims in
federal district court.

40. Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, supra note 34, at 1018. Private litigants who
bring election challenges are more incentivized to bring meritorious claims than spurious claims.
As the name for sore-loser laws suggests, candidates face considerable ignominy for bringing an
election challenge. They are vulnerable to portrayal as refusing to accept defeat graciously. A
candidate willing to become an election challenger is a candidate who is willing to forfeit future
political aspirations if her challenge is revealed to be baseless. An organization or political party
willing to support a voter in bringing an election challenge would be subject to similar criticisms.
Whether party or candidate, the challenger would have to grapple with the potential shame of
losing publicly a second time. Further, any candidate or party that is so unmoored as to be
unchecked by that chastening concern is likely a candidate or party that is so on the fringe that
the public would not even credit their claims of election failure or follow the litigation. In such a
case, the public would accept the originally announced results as final and consider any ongoing
litigation nothing more than an inevitable confirmation of those results. Finally, the legal system
has a number of safeguards against spurious and manipulative claims, including sanctions, swift
dismissals, and counterclaims. Those ordinary safeguards are sufficient without the imposition of
prohibitive, election-specific procedures.
41. See Frank Bajak, Georgia Election Server Wiped After Suit Filed, AP NEWS (Oct. 27,
2017), https://apnews.com/877ee1015f1c43f1965f63538b035d3f [https://perma.cc/6FV3-MF68]
(reporting that a server was wiped just after a “security expert disclosed a gaping security hole,”
and that “[t]he server data could have revealed whether Georgia’s most recent elections were
compromised by hackers”).
42. See infra Part II.C.
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A. Shortened Deadlines and Expensive Fees
Understandably, states generally require that an election
challenge be filed promptly after Election Day. If challenges were
allowed indefinitely, legitimate challenges might not be brought until
deep into the allegedly wrongful victor’s tenure of service. A greatly
delayed revelation of mistaken election results would undermine the
legitimacy of governance. Voters and legal systems would have to
reckon with relics of the invalid exercise of public office: the
prosecutorial choices of improperly elected district attorneys, the
swing votes of improperly elected legislators, and the common law
making of improperly elected state supreme court judges. A state’s
interest in the timely resolution of any doubts as to the integrity of an
election is clear.43
However, some states require the filing of petitions challenging
elections almost immediately after an election—long before the victor
would be inaugurated. For example, Maryland gubernatorial primary
elections may only be challenged within three days of the results being
certified.44 In South Carolina, elections may only be challenged “not
later than noon five days” after the state board has canvassed votes.45
Florida and Alaska both require that any challenge be filed within ten
days of that election’s certification.46 Virginia, too, requires that a
complaint challenging a primary or special election be filed within ten
days of Election Day.47
Some states also require that any appeal concerning an election
challenge also be filed within a very short time period. For example, in
North Carolina, an “election protest” must be filed by the second
business day after the board of elections has declared the results,48 and
a challenger must appeal a dismissal of her protest within ten days of
the decision.49

43. Professor Joshua A. Douglas champions this interest in swiftness and repose: “Strict
deadlines help to promote quick finality, which is good for the legitimacy of the eventual winner
and the process itself.” Joshua A. Douglas, Procedural Fairness in Election Contests, 88 IND. L.J.
1, 46. [hereinafter Douglas, Procedural Fairness].
44. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-202(b)(2) (2018).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-17-260 (2018).
46. ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 15.20.540, .550 (2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(1), (2) (2018).
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-808 (2018).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163A-1177(b)(4)a–c (2018).
49. Id. § 163A-1183(b).
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In New Hampshire, the only remedy available for election
challengers is an application for a recount.50 Candidates must file this
application by the Friday following the election.51 All recent New
Hampshire elections have fallen on Tuesdays.52 Candidates are
therefore only allotted three days to discover a potential election
failure, decide whether to challenge the election on that ground, gather
enough evidence to do so, and prepare an application. If that
application is denied, a challenger must appeal to another New
Hampshire commission within three days.53 If that commission’s review
is also unfavorable, the challenger must then appeal to the state
supreme court within five days.54
In addition, some states employ much more expensive filing fees
for election challenges than for other actions. Virginia charges the
challenger as much as $100 per challenged precinct,55 putting a
statewide election challenge at a cost of over $270,000.56 Alabama
requires $5,000 upon the filing of an election challenge as an upfront
court cost.57 When a challenger alleges election fraud in Oklahoma, she
must pay $5,000 per county allegedly affected.58 Therefore, alleging
statewide election fraud in Oklahoma costs $385,000.

50. See JACK MASKELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGAL PROCESSES FOR CONTESTING
RESULTS OF A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 4 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44659.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GH8F-YUNG] (“New Hampshire law does not appear to provide a specific
statutory scheme for election contests relating to federal elections, but rather provides for a
process for a recount and an appeal and hearing on such recount results.”).
51. Id. (citation omitted).
52. See N.H. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2018-2019 POLITICAL CALENDAR 1, http://sos.nh.gov/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=8589972718 [https://perma.cc/LG2C-HSNA] (listing the
dates for elections in 2018 and 2019).
53. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 665:8 (2018).
54. Id. § 665:16.
55. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-803(B) (2018).
56. See 2016 Presidential General Election Precinct Results, VA. DEP’T OF ELECTIONS,
http://historical.elections.virginia.gov/elections/view/80871/ [https://perma.cc/B3P2-DJUM]
(follow the “Download this Election” hyperlink, then follow the “Precinct Results” hyperlink)
(listing a total of over 2700 precincts in Virginia).
57. ALA. CODE. § 17-16-63 (2017). In contrast, filing fees for other types of civil claims in
Alabama state court do not exceed $1297 for civil cases. See id. § 12-19-71.
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 8-119 (2018). Filing suit in other kinds of civil cases costs, at most,
$232.14 in Oklahoma state court. Id. tit. 28, § 152.
THE
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B. Extrajudicial Adjudication, Summary Proceedings, and Lack of
Appellate Process
Some states provide that an election challenger may not be heard
in the state’s judicial system at all. These states instead relegate
determination of election challenges to an administrative agency or to
a commission of executive officials and legislators. Even of those states
that do allow challengers access to the state court system, some require
that the proceedings be conducted in a summary manner.
In Colorado, state courts “hear and determine [election
challenges] in a summary manner,” and there is no jury.59 In Kansas, a
trial judge serves as factfinder over state legislative election challenges
and then delivers her findings to the Legislature.60 The Legislature, as
a whole, chooses a winner.61 Neither the trial judge’s findings nor the
Legislature’s decisions are appealable.62 Challengers of elections in
New Hampshire must apply to the Secretary of State for a recount.63
The Secretary’s decision may be appealed, but only to the state’s Ballot
Law Commission.64 Only on appeal from that decision is the challenger
finally heard in court.65 Virginia election challenges are held “before a
special judicial panel” without a jury.66 Depending on the size of an
election, a North Carolina election challenger must either file her
challenge with the county board of elections or with the State Board of
Elections.67 County board decisions must be reviewed by the State

59. COLO. R. CIV. P. 100(b).
60. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-1451(a) (2018).
61. Id. § 25-1451(b).
62. See id. § 25-1450 (stating that “contests involving the office of state senator or
representative” are not appealable).
63. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 660:5 (2018).
64. Id. § 665:8.
65. See id. § 665:16 (“There may be an appeal to the supreme court from the decisions of the
ballot law commission . . . .”).
66. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-805, -810 (2018).
67. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 163A-1177 (2018) (“A protest concerning the conduct of an
election may be filed with the county board of elections . . . .”); id. § 163A-1178(d)(2)d (requiring
that the county board order the protest and that the county board’s decision be sent to the State
Board if the county board determines that “[t]here is substantial evidence to believe that a
violation of the election law or other irregularity or misconduct did occur, and might have affected
the outcome of the election, but [that] the board is unable to finally determine the effect because
the election was a multicounty election”); id. § 163A-1180 (“The State Board may consider
protests that were not filed in compliance with [§ 163A-1177].”).
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Board of Elections.68 Only then may State Board decisions be appealed
in state court.69
Professor Joshua A. Douglas attests that “[b]y far, the most
common mechanism states use for resolving contests for state house
and senate seats is to leave the matter to each respective house in the
legislature.”70 In addition, he says that thirteen states require the
legislature to decide gubernatorial and lieutenant gubernatorial
election challenges.71 In these states, the decision of the legislature is
the first and final adjudication of the challenge, as no appeals are
allowed.72 And in three states, special legislative committees decide
executive election challenges.73
C. Confluence of Multiple Procedural Barriers
The concurrence of even two of the above procedural
mechanisms74 amplifies the risk of unfairness to election challengers.
And it is not uncommon for states to adopt multiple procedural
barriers.75 Louisiana’s statutory scheme, in particular, has many
components that work together to inhibit election challenges, including
short deadlines, summary proceedings, and narrow discovery. While
any one of these barriers alone could be prohibitive enough to thwart
a meritorious challenge, the stacking of these barriers, and the
interactions between them, compounds the difficulty for challengers.

68. See id. § 163A-1180 (“The State Board may . . . intervene and take jurisdiction over
protests pending before a county board . . . .”).
69. Id. § 163A-1183(b).
70. Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 43, at 5.
71. Id. at 12, n.72 (citations omitted).
72. See id. at 12 (“In these states there is no possibility of appeal; the legislature has the final
say in who won the election.”).
73. Id. at 13 (citations omitted).
74. There are, of course, more types of procedural barriers to election challenges. For
example, Maryland requires challengers to meet a clear and convincing standard. MD. CODE
ANN., ELEC. LAW § 12-204(d) (2018). And New Hampshire does not allow election actions to be
brought unless the initial vote count resulted in a slim margin between the top two candidates.
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 660:1, :7 (2018). The greater the margin between the candidates, the
more a litigant must pay to challenge the election. Id. § 660:2.
75. Even in the limited survey provided here, several states employ multiple procedural
barriers to election challenges. See, e.g., supra note 44 and accompanying text (Maryland); supra
note 46 and accompanying text (Alaska); supra notes 47, 55–56, 66 and accompanying text
(Virginia); supra notes 48–49, 67–69 and accompanying text (North Carolina); supra notes 50–54,
63–65 and accompanying text (New Hampshire); supra note 57 and accompanying text
(Alabama); infra notes 117–21 and accompanying text (Alabama); infra note 87 and
accompanying text (Louisiana).
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In Louisiana, a candidate must file her election challenge “not
later than 4:30 p.m. of the ninth day after the date of the election.”76
The challenger must be able to present her case within four days of
filing suit.77 That proceeding is “tried summarily, without a jury.”78
Summary proceedings in Louisiana, as in many other states, are to be
“conducted with rapidity.”79 In Louisiana, judges may choose to hear
the challenge entirely “in chambers,” rather than having the case “be
tried in open court.”80 If the challenger wishes to appeal the decision
reached through this summary process, she has twenty-four hours to
appeal the decision.81 She then has no more than five days before that
appellate hearing.82 After the appellate decision is rendered, a
challenger has forty-eight hours to file an appeal to the Supreme Court
of Louisiana.83
Louisiana’s narrow discovery rules for election challenges require
that a litigant make an initial showing before she is able to conduct any
discovery.84 A litigant must file a sworn affidavit of a poll watcher or
election official who has personally witnessed an election irregularity.85
Candidates who are underfunded and understaffed often lack poll
watchers on election days, so for many challengers, an affidavit from a
state employee is the only way forward. The pressures of local politics
make it unlikely that a public official would go on the record to
challenge the integrity of the electoral process86—whether or not the
affidavit assigns any blame for the election failure. An assemblage of
voters might come forward, willing to testify about the electronic
voting machine failures they experienced, but none of those voters can

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1405(B) (2018).
Id. § 18:1409(A)(1) (2012).
Id.
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 2591 (2018).
Id. art. 2595.
LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1409(D).
Id. (D)–(F).
Id. (G).
Id. § 18:1415(C) (2018).
Id.
See Dana Chisnell & Whitney Quesenbery, CTR. FOR CIVIC DESIGN, SECURITY
INSIGHTS AND ISSUES FOR POLL WORKERS 15 (2014), https://civicdesign.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Pollworkers-and-security-2014-1018c.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2QQZ7F2] (“Relationships outside the polling place may make it easier [for poll workers] to conspire,
or to let things go that should be checked and/or corrected.”).
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themselves trigger discovery rights for the challenger, nor can they
compel election officials to corroborate those voting experiences.87
Assuming that an election challenger is able to find a statutorily
qualified state employee to attest to an Election Day malfunction, the
discovery process triggered by that affidavit is still remarkably
constrained.88 Depositions are limited to election officials and their
employees.89 The challenger must wait until the standard time for
ballot opening—three days after the election90—before she can gain
access to the evidence therein.91 This limits all meaningful, data-based
discovery to a six-day window because no further discovery is allowed
after the challenge has been filed.92 These constraints leave challengers
potentially unable to pinpoint exactly what caused the broken Election
Day experiences of voters who come forward to report malfunctions.
An election challenger is not allowed to seek a rehearing or new trial
on the matter,93 so her opportunities to add new evidence—even
evidence that was previously unknown or unattainable—are
nonexistent, unless the court “upon its own motion” decides to correct
“manifest error.”94
It is not difficult to imagine that challenging an election under this
set of rules would often be futile, even if the challenger’s allegations
are grounded in an actual election malfunction or breach. Perhaps the
only challengers who would be able to successfully navigate these
requirements—an accelerated schedule, little access to election data,
and reliance on either scarce poll watchers or the corroboration of state
employees—are those already embedded in local political networks.

87. See § 18:1415(C) (listing only poll watchers, election commissioners, and election officials
as those whose affidavit can trigger discovery rights for an election challenger).
88. Id. § 18:1415(D).
89. Id.
90. Id. § 18:573(A)(1) (“The voting machines . . . shall remain locked or otherwise secured
and . . . sealed until the third day after the election . . . .”). This subsection also provides that this
three-day waiting period could be shortened in the event of judicial intervention; however, the
clear language of § 18:1415(D) seems to foreclose such a court order in the context of an election
challenge.
91. Id. § 18:1405(B); § 18:1415(A), (D), (F) (providing, together, that discovery must occur
between the third day after the election—the opening of the voting machines—and the ninth day
after the election—the filing deadline).
92. Id. § 18:1415(F).
93. Id. § 18:1409(I).
94. Id.
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II. FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE ON ELECTION LAW
Federal courts have historically avoided becoming embroiled in
election disputes, matters which are both political in nature and
generally left to the states. However, during the civil rights movement,
the Supreme Court became more involved in enunciating the
constitutional requirements states must uphold in administering
elections. More recently, the Court has shown itself willing even to rule
on the details of Election Day. This Part provides a historical
background of federal involvement in elections; it describes the unique
status of the right to vote, a first among constitutional equals; and it
explores the current jurisprudence on procedural due process claims in
the context of election challenges. In particular, while the Supreme
Court has become more willing to intervene to protect the right to vote,
the courts of appeals have remained aloof. They turn a blind eye when
unfair state procedures make it difficult—or impossible—for
challengers to prove and remedy election failures.
A. Elections and Federalism
The U.S. Constitution expressly leaves elections—even elections
for federal office—within the realm of state control, subject only to
limited federal interference: “The Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof . . . .”95 The
Seventeenth Amendment reaffirms this designation of power, stating,
“The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for
electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.”96
The Supreme Court has historically been leery of intruding upon
state control over elections.97 Cases about elections fall at the
intersection of two fields the Court sparingly enters. First, the Court is
generally hesitant to upset separation-of-powers principles by
answering questions properly left to the “political branches” of the

95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see also id. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (“The House of Representatives
shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature.”); Hugh M. Lee, An Analysis of State and Federal
Remedies for Election Fraud, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 159, 164 (2001) (explaining that even for
presidential elections, federal law makes limited intrusions into the states’ selection of electors).
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
97. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
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executive and the legislature.98 Second, federalism values are
implicated when federal courts interfere with what would otherwise be
left to the states.99 When asked to answer questions about elections,
courts have cited the principle that the federal judiciary should avoid
entering the “political thicket” at the intersection of these two
prudential concerns.100
In Colegrove v. Green,101 the Court eschewed “issue[s] . . . of a
peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination.”102 When asked to address malapportionment of
electoral districts in Illinois, the Court said that it was not competent
to redraw district maps.103 “It is hostile to a democratic system,” the
Court continued, “to involve the judiciary in the politics of the
people.”104 This insistence on remaining “aloof”105 diminished over
time as the Court acknowledged that the importance of preserving the
right to vote overshadows prudential doctrines of avoidance.106 By the
time 2000 brought hanging chads and Bush v. Gore,107 the Court’s
willingness to become “embroiled . . . in partisan conflict” contrasted
sharply with its stark refusal in Colegrove.108 Professor Sam Issacharoff
wrote about the new era that Bush v. Gore seemed to usher in—one of
robust federal involvement in election administration, fully in the midst
of the political thicket: “[T]he Supreme Court . . . has asserted a new
constitutional requirement: to avoid disparate and unfair treatment of
voters. And this obligation obviously cannot be limited to the recount
process alone. . . . The [C]ourt’s new standard may create a more robust
constitutional examination of voting practices.”109

98. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962) (“The nonjusticiability of a political
question is primarily a function of the separation of powers. . . [and involves] [d]eciding whether
a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of
government.”).
99. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552.
100. Id.
101. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 553.
104. Id. at 553–54.
105. Id. at 553.
106. See infra Part II.B.
107. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
108. Id. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
109. Samuel Issacharoff, Opinion, The Court in the Crossfire, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2000),
https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/14/opinion/the-court-in-the-crossfire.html [https://perma.cc/
D5AC-H6QX].
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B. The Right to Vote
The U.S. Constitution does not enumerate an express right to
vote. However, once a state extends the franchise, that “fundamental
political right” is constitutionally protected.110 This right to vote—as
central and fundamental as the right to bodily integrity—is
“preservative of [all] other basic civil and political rights.”111 Allow the
right to vote to be infringed upon, and that deprivation will completely
“undermine[] the legitimacy of representative government.”112 When
the right to vote is violated, the laws created and enforced by elected
officials can no longer be considered an expression of citizens’ free
choice and self-determination. As the Court said in Wesberry v.
Sanders,113 “No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which,
as good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are
illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”114
In Reynolds v. Sims,115 the foundational decision on voting rights,
the Supreme Court held that “any alleged infringement of the right of
citizens to vote must be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.”116
There, the plaintiffs challenged the apportionment of Alabama’s
legislative districts, claiming that the existing districts deprived them of
their right to vote under the Equal Protection Clause.117 The district
boundaries had not been adjusted to reflect population shifts and
growth through the decades.118 At the time of the hearing, one
Alabama state senate district contained over 600,000 people, while
another contained only 15,417 people.119 The Reynolds plaintiffs had

110. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886)). The fundamental right to vote, protected by the Equal Protection Clause, is also a
liberty interest protected by the Substantive Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amends. V &
XIV; United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234, 250 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (three-judge District Court),
summarily aff’d, 384 U.S. 155 (1966) (“[I]n . . . light of Supreme Court pronouncements describing
it as our most ‘precious’ right, and . . . the ‘essence of a democratic society,’ it cannot be doubted
that the right to vote is one of the fundamental personal rights included within the concept of
liberty as protected by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.”).
111. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
112. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
113. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
114. Id. at 17.
115. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
116. Id. at 562.
117. Id. at 536–37.
118. Id. at 542–43.
119. Id. at 546.
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been allowed to cast votes under the apportionment plan as it stood.
Nevertheless, the Court held that the plaintiffs’ right to vote had been
impaired.120 The right to vote, then, is not merely the right to cast a
ballot, but also the right to have a “[f]ull and effective vote.”121
The Court in Reynolds elaborated that the right to vote
encompasses one’s right to “put a ballot in a box,” the right to be
spared any destruction or alteration of the ballot once cast, the right to
a ballot box that has not been stuffed fraudulently, the right to have
one’s vote counted, and the right to a vote that is undiluted by
malapportionment.122 This broad constitutional protection of voting
rights runs the gamut of election administration. From the shaping of
constituencies to the printing of electronic voting machine results, a
state’s policies impacting the right to vote are subject to constitutional
boundaries. Primaries, local elections, and referendums are all
encompassed within these constitutional protections.123 If a citizen’s
vote is lost, changed, or even accidently left out of a final tallying, that
citizen’s constitutional right has been violated, just as it would be if she
were prevented from casting any vote at all.124 A vote lost to a software
breach or malfunction prevents the voter from participating in
democracy by withholding from her the “political equality” that
underlies the principle of “one person, one vote.”125
Since Reynolds, the Court’s analysis of equal protection claims126
concerning the right to vote has evolved.127 The primary driver of that
120. Id. at 566.
121. Id. at 565.
122. Id. at 554–57 (citations omitted).
123. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 661–62 (1944) (primary election); City of Phoenix
v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970) (local tax bond); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No.
15, 395 U.S. 621, 628–29 (1969) (local tax bond); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 319–20
(1941) (primary election).
124. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise
of the franchise.”).
125. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) (emphasizing that “the conception of
political equality . . . can mean only one thing—one person, one vote”).
126. Substantive due process claims can be brought in conjunction with equal protection
claims when an election failure has deprived someone of her full and effective vote. See, e.g.,
League of Women Voters of Ohio v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 474, 477–78 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding
that plaintiffs brought valid equal protection and substantive due process claims where the state
failed to prevent and correct election problems such as twelve-hour wait times at polling places,
inadequate poll-worker training, voter rolls that lacked large swaths of voter names, and
widespread misuse of provisional ballots that caused 22 percent of the ballots to be ineligible).
127. When a litigant brings a claim that her right to equal protection has been violated, she is
essentially bringing a claim that the government has improperly treated her differently than those
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evolution has been efficiency—because the right to vote is
fundamental, every election law would trigger “strict scrutiny” under
modern equal protection analysis.128 The Court recognized in
Anderson v. Celebrezze129 that subjecting every election regulation to
strict scrutiny would invalidate such large swaths of election codes that
chaos would ensue.130
A new, “more flexible standard” was implemented by the Court
in Burdick v. Takushi.131 Now a state’s “precise” justifications for and
the necessity of a burdensome rule are to be balanced against “the
character and magnitude” of the alleged injury to the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.132 When a plaintiff challenges state election laws,
courts must apply a more rigorous standard of review the more the law
burdens First and Fourteenth Amendments rights.133 If a rule places a
severe burden on those rights, it “must be narrowly drawn to advance
a state interest of compelling importance.”134 If a rule only restricts
those rights in a reasonable and nondiscriminatory way, then important
regulatory interests are usually enough to justify the rule.135 For
example, where state law prevents a candidate from listing more than
one party affiliation on the ballot, the burden placed on voting rights is
similarly situated to her. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004). Modern equal protection
analysis requires courts to apply different standards of judicial scrutiny for different kinds of
government actions. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–41 (1985).
Courts are skeptical of claims when the governmental action has neither infringed on a
fundamental right nor differentiated between people on the basis of their race, national origin,
ethnicity, or gender. Id. at 439–40. For these kinds of claims, the court merely applies “rational
basis” scrutiny, making it almost certain that the challenged government action will be upheld.
Id. On the other hand, when the challenged government action infringes on a fundamental right—
such as the right to have one’s vote counted equally—the court applies a heightened level of
scrutiny. Id. at 440. The highest standard, “strict scrutiny,” requires the most of a challenged
government action. Id. Namely, strict scrutiny requires that the government’s action advance a
compelling interest and that it be narrowly tailored to serve that purpose. Id. Challenged
governmental actions are very unlikely to survive strict scrutiny. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
634 (1996).
128. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (holding that “laws are subjected to strict scrutiny” when
they “impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution”).
129. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
130. Id. at 788; see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992) (“[T]o subject every
voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of States seeking to assure that
elections are operated equitably and efficiently.”).
131. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
132. Id. (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789).
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
135. Id.
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not severe.136 The state’s interests in preventing voter confusion and
ballot overcrowding are sufficiently weighty to justify the restriction.137
On the other hand, where faulty voting machines prevent individuals’
votes from being properly counted, the burden on the right to vote is
severe.138 This burden does not merely impact a “tangential aspect of
the franchise”; it instead prevents some individuals from participating
in the franchise altogether for reasons that are entirely outside of their
control.139 These severe vote deprivations cannot be justified by a
state’s interests in saving money, time, or administrative effort.140
C. Procedural Due Process Claims About Election Challenges
When an election challenger uses state law vehicles to challenge
elections and election policies, she has purportedly already been
deprived of her most precious liberty interest.141 Therefore, a state’s
procedure for addressing these alleged vote deprivations must comport
with the fairness principles of the Due Process Clause.142 In particular,
procedural due process places requirements on governmental
decisions that result in the deprivation of an individual’s Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest.143 In the case of an election failure, an
individual’s lost or miscounted vote is not a “final” deprivation of her
liberty interest until she has exhausted her state’s provided remedies
to no avail. If an election challenger is successful in her state
proceedings and the state appropriately responds to the election failure
complained of—by conducting a recount, further investigation, or
special election—there has been no deprivation of the right to vote. It
is only when the state fails to act to correct an election failure and fails
to provide an adequate remedy for election challengers that vote

136. See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997) (“That a particular
individual may not appear on the ballot as a particular party’s candidate does not severely burden
that party’s associational rights.”).
137. Id. at 367.
138. Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 860–62, 868–69 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 473
F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
139. Id. at 867.
140. See id. at 869 (“[T]he State’s proffered justifications of cost and training are wholly
insufficient . . . . Administrative convenience is simply not a compelling justification in light of the
fundamental nature of the right.”).
141. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws . . . .”).
142. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
143. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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deprivation becomes a constitutional violation. This means that claims
of vote tampering or voting machine software glitches are not
justiciable in federal court until the election challenger has raised the
issue through her state’s particular process—be it summary,
extrajudicial, or subject to rapid filing deadlines. Further, there is no
common law basis for election challenges, so election challengers are
limited to the statutory scheme supplied by the state legislature.144
1. Procedural Due Process, Generally. The Supreme Court has not
yet fully delineated how claims about the unfairness of state electionchallenge procedures should be adjudicated. However, the Court has
supplied general guidelines for procedural due process claims. Central
to the principle of due process is a requirement that an individual be
allowed a full, open, and fair hearing before the government may
deprive her of a liberty interest.145 The Court has described this
requirement as one that proceedings be “fundamentally fair,”146 and
that a litigant be given “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.’”147
In Mathews v. Eldridge,148 the Court introduced a balancing test
for determining whether a particular process is constitutionally
sufficient in its fairness to litigants:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the

144. See, e.g., Parker v. Mount Olive Fire & Rescue Dist., 420 So. 2d 31, 33 (Ala. 1982) (citing
“the well-settled principle that ‘[e]lection contests are not of common law origin, but are creatures
of statutes which prescribe the terms and conditions of their exercise’” (alteration in original)
(citation omitted)).
145. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“An essential
principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be preceded by notice
and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.’” (citation omitted)); Morgan
v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938) (“Those who are brought into contest with the
Government . . . are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be
heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command.”).
146. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981).
147. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
148. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976).
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function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.149

The Court went on to explain that “the degree of potential
deprivation” is properly considered under the first factor.150 The
second factor—the “reliability” of current procedures and potential
alternatives151—is broad in scope. In applying this second factor, the
Court identified several fairness characteristics, including whether the
plaintiff has access to crucial information in the state’s possession,
whether she has the right to introduce relevant evidence and
arguments, and whether she has ample time to do so. The Court
emphasized that the plaintiff in Mathews had “full access to all
information relied upon by the state agency.”152 The plaintiff had also
been given the opportunity “to submit additional evidence or
arguments” and “to challenge directly the accuracy of information”
submitted by the state agency.153 And the plaintiff “always” had the
right to “submit new evidence,” instead of being held to a strict
discovery or filing schedule.154
In its opinion in Mathews, and in several opinions since, the Court
cited Judge Henry J. Friendly’s formulation of procedural due
process.155 Judge Friendly prioritizes “elements of a fair hearing,”
including an unbiased tribunal,156 notice,157 the right to present
evidence (including the right to call witnesses),158 the right to know

149. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 341 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 343.
152. Id. at 345–46.
153. Id. at 346.
154. Id. at 347.
155. See id. at 343, 348 (discussing procedural due process and citing Henry J. Friendly, Some
Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975)); see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110 (2000)
(same); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 325–26 (1985) (same);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (same); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v.
Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (same).
156. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 1279; see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v.
Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (“[D]ue process requires a
‘neutral and detached judge in the first instance.’” (citation omitted)).
157. See, e.g., Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 234 (2006) (“[D]ue process requires the
government to provide adequate notice of the impending taking.”).
158. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 1282; see also Londoner v. City and Cty. of Denver, 210
U.S. 373, 386 (1908) (“[A] hearing in its very essence demands that he who is entitled to it shall
have the right to support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof,
however informal.”).
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opposing evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.159
Like the notice requirement,160 the “unbiased tribunal” requirement
has been described as “the floor established by the Due Process
Clause.”161 A “fair trial in a fair tribunal” cannot be guaranteed,
according to the Court, unless the adjudicator has “no actual bias
against the [individual] or interest in the outcome of his particular
case.”162
2. Circuit Approaches to Procedural Due Process Claims About
Election Challenges. Federal courts of appeals have not followed the
Mathews balancing test for procedural due process when hearing
claims about election challenges. The circuits have tended to follow a
more formalistic analysis of these claims, guided by notions of
federalism163 and judicial economy.164 A common rendering comes
from the First Circuit in Griffin v. Burns.165 The Griffin court
distinguished between cases in which federal courts should intervene,
on the one hand, and on the other, cases that feature mere “garden
variety election irregularities” and facially adequate state remedies.166
Griffin treated the election process as “including as part thereof the
state’s administrative and judicial corrective process.”167 The court
reported that federal courts do not, and should not, intervene in state
159. See Friendly, supra note 155, at 1282–87 (discussing the rights to “[k]now the [e]vidence
[a]gainst [o]ne” and to “[c]all [w]itnesses” as elements of a fair hearing).
160. Though notice is not in question when a private litigant initiates an election challenge,
the reasoning behind the notice requirement is relevant in such a proceeding. The Court has
explained that the purpose of the notice requirement is to allow individuals to adequately prepare
for hearings. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 14 (1978) (“The purpose of
notice under the Due Process Clause is to apprise the affected individual of, and permit adequate
preparation for, an impending ‘hearing.’”). This rationale is informative in considering the harsh
deadlines often featured in state election-challenge procedures. See supra Part I.A. The Due
Process Clause, therefore, is implicated when deadlines are so short that election challengers
cannot adequately prepare beforehand. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (requiring that a litigant be
provided a “meaningful time” period (citations omitted)).
161. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904–05 (1997) (citations omitted).
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Absent a clear and
unambiguous mandate from Congress, we are not inclined to undertake such a wholesale
expansion of our jurisdiction into an area which, with certain narrow and well defined exceptions,
has been in the exclusive cognizance of the state courts.”).
164. See infra notes 192–97 and accompanying text.
165. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1978).
166. Id. at 1076–77; see Shannon, 394 F.3d at 96 (citing Griffin’s “garden variety” electiondispute paradigm); Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 702 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981) (referring
to the Griffin framework for adjudicating election challenges).
167. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1078.
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election administration as long as “the alleged misconduct is lacking in
‘enormity’” and the available state remedy “appear[s] to be
adequate.”168 This standard allows for federal intervention only when
the election process—including the “state corrective process”—rises to
the level “of patent and fundamental unfairness.”169
The First Circuit only intervened in Griffin because the election
challengers could demonstrate both that “a broad-gauged unfairness
. . . infected the results of . . . [the] election” and that “the federal court
was the only practical forum [available] for redress” because no state
procedure existed for election challenges of the sort.170 The court
viewed this high bar as necessary, saying that the instant case was “one
of the perhaps exceptional cases where a district court could properly
exercise the limited supervisory role that such courts have in election
cases.”171 The Ninth Circuit has gone a step further than Griffin, saying
that “garden variety election irregularities generally do not violate the
Due Process Clause, even if they control the outcome of the vote or
election.”172
The Seventh Circuit has also been hesitant to hear claims
concerning election challenges, saying that “not every election
irregularity . . . will give rise to a constitutional claim.”173 The Seventh
Circuit requires a showing that state officials purposefully,
systematically, or willfully acted to deprive voters of their liberty
interest in a meaningfully executed vote.174 This extra requirement
leaves federal courts impotent when election results are improperly
impacted by electronic voting machine malfunctions, software
misprogramming, a state official’s negligence, or even intentional
tampering by private parties or foreign states. The Seventh Circuit
went so far as to say that such election failures “fall far short of
constitutional infractions” simply because they do not involve
fraudulent or willful conduct of a state official.175 The Second Circuit
also requires a showing that intentional action by a state official caused

168. Id. at 1077 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 1077.
170. Id. at 1078–79 (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 1079.
172. Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998).
173. Hennings v. Grafton, 523 F.2d 861, 864 (7th Cir. 1975).
174. See id. (“Infringements of voting rights found to have risen to a constitutional level
include . . . purposeful or systematic discrimination against voters . . . and other willful conduct
which undermines the organic processes by which candidates are selected . . . .”).
175. Id.
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the election failure.176 That court has said that federal “[c]ourts may
consider the adequacy and fairness of the state remedy only after they
first conclude that” the election failure was caused “by intentional state
action.”177 The Eighth Circuit, too, requires intentional unlawful
conduct on the part of state actors before becoming involved in a due
process election claim.178 The Eighth Circuit has further said that even
when a state provides no forum for an election challenge, federal courts
should not hear a procedural due process claim that does not allege
intentional government wrongdoing.179
In the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, Griffin’s formalistic
distinction has become more extreme: either an election problem was
caused by “an intentional act on the part of the government or its
officials,” or the election problem is merely “garden variety” and must
be ignored by the federal courts.180 Even massive election failures could
fall within the latter, outcast category. In fact, the Second Circuit said
that a malfunctioning electronic voting machine is “the paradigmatic
example of a ‘garden variety’ election dispute” that federal courts
should avoid.181 The Second Circuit also identifies “mechanical and
human error in counting votes” and “technical deficiencies in printing
ballots” as beyond the ken of the Due Process Clause—presumably
even if those failures impact the outcome of elections.182
In expressing its reluctance to intervene in cases about election
challenges, the Griffin court cited a worry over the level of
administrative oversight it would have to provide. The court imagined
having to count ballots, examine their validity, and “enter into the
details of the administration of the election.”183 The Second Circuit,
too, cited this concern of “henceforth be[ing] thrust into the details of
virtually every election, tinkering with the state’s election machinery,
reviewing petitions, registration cards, vote tallies, and certificates of
176. See Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing a voting machine
failure as a mere “unfortunate but unintended irregularity”).
177. Id.
178. See Pettengill v. Putnam Cty. R-1 Sch. Dist., 472 F.2d 121, 122 (8th Cir. 1973) (refusing
to intervene “in the absence of aggravating factors” such as intentional racial discrimination,
fraudulent interference, or other affirmative unlawful acts by government actors).
179. See id. (“Appellants complain that the state courts of Missouri will not afford them a
forum for their complaint [of an election failure]. The lack of a state remedy to appellants does
not alone operate to give federal jurisdiction over their cause.” (citations omitted)).
180. Shannon, 394 F.3d at 96.
181. Id. (citation omitted).
182. Id. (citations omitted).
183. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078 (1st Cir. 1978).
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election for all manner of error and insufficiency under state and
federal law.”184
As discussed further below, the circuits’ reductive categories—
“garden variety” errors, intentional government wrongdoing, errors
with “enormity,” state challenge procedures that “appear” to be fair—
are a departure from traditional notions of due process, constitutional
protections of voting rights, and the tests established by Burdick and
Mathews.
III. DEMANDING MORE FROM ELECTION CHALLENGE
PROCEDURES
Federal courts have improperly handled claims about the
unconstitutional unfairness of state election challenges. This Part
proposes a new analytical approach for these electoral due process
claims—that is, claims that involve both alleged vote deprivations and
fundamentally unfair state challenge procedures. This approach is
faithful to both Burdick and Mathews.
A. Uprooting “Garden Variety” Unfairness: The Brokenness of
Circuit Approaches
The procedural due process analysis currently employed by the
circuits improperly undercuts the injuries—and rights—at stake in
election challenges. First, the circuits have departed from proper
Mathews procedural due process analysis in the context of election
challenges. Second, the circuits have improperly avoided applying
Burdick altogether, thwarting equal protection claims that should
often be heard on the merits in federal court. Third, judicial concerns
over micromanaging election administration are misplaced and should
not be cited as a reason to evade claims of election failure.
First, while unfair challenge procedures can reach the level of a
substantive burden on the right to vote, the Court has enunciated one
test for analyzing claims about procedural unfairness and a distinct test
for claims about substantive liberty-interest deprivations. The Circuits,
however, have been hybridizing these two distinct steps, completely
conflating a challenger’s vote deprivation and her procedural due
process deprivation. The court in Griffin stated that “local election
irregularities, including even claims of official misconduct, do not
usually rise to the level of constitutional violations where adequate state
184. Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1970).
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corrective procedures exist.”185 That court also said that if an election
process were “patent[ly] and fundamental[ly unfair[],” that deprivation
of the right to vote would merit intervention from a federal court only
if the “state corrective process” is found inadequate.186 But inadequacy
is not the constitutional test for procedural fairness. Mathews provides
a balancing test that accounts for the magnitude of the underlying
deprivation. Mere labeling of a process as adequate is not a substitute
for that constitutional analysis. A threshold question of adequacy gives
state procedures and election laws a higher level of deference than they
are owed under Mathews or Burdick.
Second, if federal courts continue to extend such deference to
state challenge proceedings, litigants will never reach the merits of the
vote-deprivation claim, and the extent of the underlying election
failure will never be determined. If a challenge procedure truly is
unfair, and if a challenger alleges procedural impossibility in federal
court, then by her very admission and petition, she has not had the
opportunity to gain access to the crucial evidence that would be needed
to prove that the election failure was beyond a “garden variety” error.
It is no wonder that federal courts so rarely grant relief under this
model. Even the most extensive cybersecurity attack would not appear
“that unfair” if no one has been allowed to look closely enough to know
that it happened. Griffin’s offhand fashioning of conjunctive
elements—broad-based unfairness in the election and a challenge
process that is patently and fundamentally unfair—heightens pleading
requirements for challengers. These challengers—who have already
turned to the federal courts because of prohibitive procedural
requirements—are thus again barred from having an opportunity for
their claims of election failure to be fully heard and fairly tried.
The court in Griffin, and the circuits that have since followed suit,
freely label alleged election injuries as “garden variety” unfairness.
This formalistic category is inapposite for election administration in the
digital age. If at the pleading stage, the court can only pinpoint a few
dozen lost votes, it should not label the seemingly small loss a mere
“garden variety” error or presume that those votes are the full extent
of the election failure. If there are allegations of voting machine
misprogramming or a cybersecurity breach, and if an election
challenger has in-hand proof of even a few malfunctions at the pleading
stage, then the integrity of the whole process should be carefully
185. Griffin, 570 F.2d at 1077 (emphasis added).
186. Id.
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inspected. The few vote deprivations that a challenger is able to detect
during the short time period187 before filing suit are likely the tip of the
iceberg.
In addition, whatever level of scrutiny this “garden variety”
formalistic labeling may be, it is certainly not the Burdick strict scrutiny
that is triggered when a severe burden has been placed on the right to
vote. In conflating substantive and procedural rights, which are
analytically and ideologically distinct, the circuits have abandoned
Burdick balancing, lowering the scrutiny for both claims to the
forgiving level of deference courts apply in ordinary procedural due
process claims.188
More worrisome yet is the requirement imposed by the Second,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that election challengers raising
procedural due process claims allege intentional wrongdoing by a state
official.189 Proving intent is notoriously difficult as it is.190 But this
requirement is also hopelessly outmoded for a digital age in which the
largest risk of election failure is not poll-worker fraud, but foreign
cybersecurity attacks that could be successfully staged by an amateur
computer programmer within sixty seconds.191 The liberty interest
involved is so important, and the potential loss so large, that the
intentionality of bad behavior by a state employee should not be a
requisite for federal court intervention when things go wrong. If a
state’s administration of elections allows election technology, systems,
or databases to be compromised, unnoticed and uncorrected, this
neglect itself deprives citizens of their votes. This level of culpability is
sufficient to place the resulting election failures within the cognizance
of the Due Process Clause—and of the federal judiciary.
Third, the court’s worry in Griffin about avoiding federal judicial
micromanagement of tedious election details is unfounded. A federal
187. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting North Carolina’s two-day filing
deadline).
188. In an ordinary procedural due process claim—for instance, where property rights are at
stake—the government’s interest in administrative ease fares well in the Mathews balancing test.
See supra Part II.C.1. In the voting rights context, however, the interest and potential deprivation
involved are so weighty as to overwhelm interests in efficiency or ease. See generally supra notes
131–40 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Marengo Cty. Comm’n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1556, 1564–65 (11th Cir.
1984) (holding that proving discriminatory intent is not required under the Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”), in part because that showing was so difficult to make that the U.S. Department of
Justice had stopped bringing claims under the VRA).
191. See Newmarker, supra note 26.
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court need not count ballots or “supervise the administrative details of
a local election” to intervene when state challenge procedures violate
due process.192 An electoral due process claim does not force the
federal court to control the detailed operations of elections. Rather,
these claims ask the court to evaluate the fairness of procedures and
burdens on federal rights—tasks the federal judiciary is competent to
perform.
In cases where the federal court decides it must intervene, it can
do so without itself performing the tasks of fashioning election
administration policies anew or of investigating the credibility of each
ballot cast. A federal court could, for instance, merely invalidate an
unfair state procedural rule and then order the state to rehear the
challenger’s claim in a fundamentally fair manner. Federal courts have
the power to fashion any number of remedies—with varying levels of
supervision—when procedural due process violations are found. Even
an instruction to a state that it must rehear a challenger’s claim could
give that litigant a better chance at fundamental fairness. This sort of
involvement and oversight by the federal judiciary is not novel. For
example, when voters challenge redistricting plans, federal courts do
not shy away from finding malapportionment and redrawing district
lines themselves.193 Rather, courts reckon with the reality that would
result from the perpetuation of the status quo, and they demand fairer
policies from the states. Here, too, federal courts should be willing to
become involved in election challenges so that they can require that
state procedural rules assure voters that their votes are counted
equally.
For the First Circuit to refuse any intervention in elections because
of an unwillingness to engage in total, detailed involvement in the
process, belies the degree of federal courts’ flexibility in fashioning
remedies. For example, in Duncan v. Poythress,194 the Fifth Circuit
found fundamental unfairness in Georgia’s election process.195 Instead
of avoiding a due process analysis of the challenged state procedure
like the Griffin court, the Fifth Circuit identified the unfair aspects of
the election process and ordered the State of Georgia to abandon the
192. Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078 (1st Cir. 1978).
193. See, e.g., Colleton Cty. Council v. McConnell, 201 F. Supp. 2d 618, 627, 629 (D.S.C. 2002)
(rejecting all six proposed districting plans and drawing its own map in accordance with
constitutional requirements).
194. Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. Unit B Sept. 1981).
195. Id. at 693, 708 (holding that the state’s refusal to hold a special election to replace a
retiring state supreme court justice disenfranchised voters).
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specific unfair practices so that Georgia voters would have a way to
meaningfully participate in representative government: “The Georgia
voters are not asking the federal courts to count ballots or otherwise
‘enter into the details of the administration of (an) election.’ Their
request is far simpler and more basic: they ask for the election itself, as
required by state law.”196 In ordering Georgia to hold a special election,
the federal court did not become responsible for administrative
oversight of that election.197 Nor did the court have to write a code to
instruct Georgia precisely how it must hold the election. Rather, the
court in Duncan enunciated a standard and allowed the state to
manage the details of obeying the resulting order. Federal courts
adjudicating electoral due process claims should not avoid analysis of
the merits merely because of the looming need to fashion a remedy.
B. Rebalancing Burdick: A New Approach for Electoral Due Process
Claims
When an election challenger seeks relief from a voting rights
violation, or even seeks to determine whether that right has been
intruded upon, that litigation is an extension of her right to vote. The
election aftermath that verifies vote counts and affirms a victor is also
a part of the election process.198 When an equal protection question of
vote deprivation intersects with a due process question of state election
challenge fairness, federal courts should faithfully apply the test of
Mathews and use the resulting balance to apply the Burdick test.
Where federal rights intersect, the decisional rule that applies should
provide rightsholders with more footholds, not fewer, though the
truncated approaches of the circuits discussed above fail in this regard.
This Section lays out an approach that is properly preservative of
constitutional rights.
In brief, when a federal court encounters one of these
intersectional electoral due process cases, it should first apply the
procedural due process test from Mathews to determine just how
unfair—that is, how burdensome—the state challenge procedure was
for the plaintiff. Second, the court should calculate a “total burden”

196. Id. at 703.
197. See id. at 708 (rejecting the argument that a federal court did not have a role to play in a
state election).
198. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by
a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”).
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that accounts for both the procedural unfairness burden from Mathews
analysis and any burden that can be demonstrated through factual
proof that an election failure occurred—for example, any data
revealing a software glitch and any testimony about tampering. This
total burden should be found severe whether the plaintiff faced an
impossibly burdensome state process and as a result lacks compelling
supporting evidence, or whether the plaintiff faced a moderately
burdensome state process but was nevertheless able to muster
meaningful evidence of an election failure. Third, if this total burden is
severe, the court should ask, under the Burdick balancing test,199
whether that infringement on the right to vote is justified by a state
policy that is narrowly drawn to advance a compellingly important
interest. Finally, if the constitutional infringement is not so justified
under Burdick, the court should fashion an appropriate remedy to
vindicate voters’ rights.
1. Applying Mathews: Calculating the Burden of Unfairness. To
review, the Mathews fairness test balances (1) the magnitude of the
plaintiff’s interest, (2) the state’s interest in preserving the procedural
status quo, and (3) the soundness of the process at issue, when
considered in light of its inherent reliability and possible alternatives.
a. The Plaintiff-Voter’s Interest. In electoral due process claims,
the first Mathews factor should weigh strongly in favor of the plaintiff,
as a categorical matter. The liberty interest at stake is that which is
preservative of all others.200 Without a meaningful right to vote,
governance ceases to be self-determined by citizens, and all property
interests and other liberty interests are vulnerable.201 Accordingly, like
the liberty interest in being free from imprisonment, the liberty interest
in voting should be given the utmost weight. In addition, Mathews
instructs that the “degree of potential deprivation” affects the weight
given to this factor.202 Where an election challenger alleges a failure
like electronic voting machine misprogramming, the potential

199. See supra notes 131–40 and accompanying text.
200. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) (holding that the right to vote is
“preservative of other basic civil and political rights”).
201. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more precious in a free
country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is
undermined.”).
202. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 412 (1976).
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deprivation is not merely the loss of the individual challenger’s right to
an effective vote, but the total deprivation of an effective vote for the
voters of entire voting districts.
In addition, each time a state ignores election failures, the
resulting lack of transparency not only leaves past interference
irreversible, but also incentivizes outcome-determinative election
interference and shields election administrators from accountability
that would deter future sloppiness.203 These liberty-interest
deprivations, then, harm past voters and future voters by making it
systemically more likely that citizens will continue to be deprived of an
equally effective vote.
Further, elections today, post-HAVA, are situated against a new
backdrop of threats in which system-wide failure is more likely.
Remote cybersecurity attacks were aimed at the majority of states
during the 2016 election cycle, and these breaches were successful in
an as-of-yet unknown number of jurisdictions.204 As election
technology has advanced, money allotted for the training of state
election administrators has not, so even innocent mistakes have the
potential to devastate election accuracy.
Because the interest involved in these cases is so weighty, and the
potential deprivation so expansive, across voters and across time, the
first Mathews factor strongly favors dismantling burdensome challenge
procedures.
b. The State’s Interest in the Status Quo. The next Mathews
factor—the state’s interest in continuing under the current procedural
rules205—should uniformly be given little weight in these electoral due
process claims. The potential state interests underlying the prohibitive

203. Congressional researchers report:
Broadly speaking, defensive measures range from those aimed at prevention of an
attack or other incident, to detection and response, to recovery after an attack . . . . [I]t
is now generally recognized among cybersecurity experts that preventive measures are
insufficient by themselves . . . . In many cases, successful attacks might not be
discovered until months later, if at all . . . . Such attacks could be especially serious if
aimed at manipulating vote counts to change the outcome of an election. Effective
defense requires ways of detecting, responding to, and recovering from successful
intrusions.
BURRIS & FISCHER, supra note 28, at 17 (citation omitted).
204. See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text.
205. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (“[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: . . . [third,] the Government’s interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.”).
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procedural burdens discussed in Part I include repose, finality, and
minimized disruption of the election process.206 These related
justifications depend on two factual assumptions: that determinative
election failures are relatively infrequent, and that the general
populace has faith in the integrity of the election process.
Today, as discussed above, both of those assumptions are suspect.
Repose of election-night returns has been lost—not by allowing
election challenges, but by public knowledge of actual attacks aimed at
American elections.207 Finality becomes less important as a
government interest when data shows that elections are more
frequently tampered with, and that the candidate first declared winner
is less likely to be the rightful one. And closing the gates on election
challenges cannot preserve trust in a process that is already widely
doubted. Americans lack faith in election integrity; that confidence has
been declining since 2000.208 The United States is the Western
democracy with the lowest score on the 2016 Perceptions of Electoral
Integrity index.209 Voter distrust is also apparent in empty polling
places on election days. Voter turnout is strongly correlated with trust
in the accuracy of election outcomes,210 and “[t]he United States has
long had one of the lowest levels of voter turnout among all equivalent
democratic states and developed economies.”211 Rather than disrupting
the public’s perception of election integrity, allowing election
challenges a full and fair hearing would bring transparency that could

206. See, e.g., Douglas, Discouraging Election Contests, supra note 34, at 1024 (“The system
craves finality, particularly on election night . . . . A contested election undermines the notion that
the winner has an electoral mandate.”).
207. See supra notes 9–24 and the accompanying text.
208. See Norris, supra note 23, at 22 (noting declining public confidence in elections since
2000).
209. Holly Ann Garnett, Max Grömping & Pippa Norris, Why Don’t More Americans Vote?
Maybe Because They Don’t Trust U.S. Elections, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/12/26/why-dont-more-americansvote-maybe-because-they-dont-trust-u-s-elections/ [https://perma.cc/UN3V-4VLU] (“The U.S.
ranks 52nd out of 153 countries worldwide in the 2016 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity index,
and at the bottom of equivalent Western democracies.”).
210. Norris, supra note 23, at 14 (“The results of the multivariate analysis confirmed that
American perceptions of electoral integrity predicted significantly lower levels of reported voting
turnout, even after controlling for several standard factors which are also associated with
participation, including educational qualifications, age, sex, race, support for the winning
presidential candidate and political interest.”).
211. Garnett et al., supra note 209. Norris reports that voter turnout in the United States has
tended to be “about 10–20 points below equivalent European societies.” Norris, supra note 23, at
14.
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give voters confidence that their votes are being accurately and
effectively counted.
States could also argue that an interest in swift determination
justifies truncated proceedings and short deadlines. There is an
important government interest in ensuring that individuals entering
elected office and engaging in governance are not dismantled midterm
by a challenge that could have, and should have, been brought sooner.
However, this interest loses its salience when states impose stringent
deadlines months in advance of inauguration day.212 For timeliness
requirements to be narrowly tailored, they would have to be more
directly connected to the dates of operation for the office in question—
whether that timing be legislative sessions, judicial terms, or
inauguration day. While it might still be unsettling for the public to
have to wait for legal proceedings to confirm the victor of an election,
it would be much more unsettling to swiftly insulate the victory of the
wrong candidate. Better to wait two months to ensure the soundness
of election results than to silence doubts and usher in a four- or six-year
term of illegitimate governance. Further, the results of the 2016
presidential election were challenged in five states,213 and America
survived the discomfort of waiting for the results.214
Mathews did say that it is appropriate to consider governmental
interests in efficient, economical processes, but this interest is only
moderately persuasive in the electoral due process context. It is not
clear how earlier filing deadlines or involvement of the state legislature
as an extrajudicial decisionmaker would save states money or effort. If
212. See Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 43, at 36 (“A state’s process has resulted in
a ‘failed election’ when its contest provisions still do not allow the state to identify a winner by
the date on which the winner is to take office.” (citation omitted)).
213. See Tresa Baldas, Kathleen Gray, Paul Egan, Detroit Free Press, Jason Stein, Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, Jeff Burlew, Tallahassee Democrat & the Associated Press, Election 2016
Recount: Where 5 States Stand, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:07 PM),
https://www.freep.com/story/news/nation/2016/12/06/election-2016-recount-where-5-statesstand/95037554/ [https://perma.cc/K97W-TM6U] (noting that Wisconsin, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Florida are “contending with requests for recounts of ballots cast in
the [2016] presidential election”); see also The Latest: 5 Nevada Counties to Recount Presidential
Race, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20161201081843/https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national/the-latest-stein-to-seek-presidential-recount-in-michigan/
2016/11/30/c760d82c-b724-11e6-939c-91749443c5e5_story.html [https://perma.cc/D7V5-FLTB]
(discussing Nevada’s recount effort).
214. See Steve Eder, Stein Ends Recount Bid, But Says It Revealed Flaws in Voting System,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/us/stein-ends-recount-bid-butsays-it-revealed-flaws-in-voting-system.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/9YGF-HPYR] (reporting
that Jill Stein, the Green Party candidate in the 2016 presidential election, closed her recount
effort on December 13, 2016).
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anything, allowing election challengers to follow procedures more
similar to those imposed on ordinary civil plaintiffs would improve
administrability for judges, clerks, and other judicial staff, who would
have to master fewer procedural eccentricities. It is conceivable that
prohibitive state procedures could save states money; after all, the
cheapest case for the government to defend against is a case that never
makes it off the ground. But litigation always costs the government
money, no matter how meritorious. Any savings that result from killing
worthwhile claims should, as a principle of public policy, not count for
much.
c. The Reliability and Fairness of Procedures. The final Mathews
prong, unlike the other two, should be reweighed for each new
procedural rule challenged through an electoral due process claim.
Though the resulting fairness values for individual procedures will
differ, this Mathews prong should always be applied in a way that
honors traditional notions of fairness. That is, the right to be heard “at
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner” should be understood
as requiring impartial factfinders, an opportunity to conduct
meaningful discovery, and reasonable deadlines that allow for
investigation and preparation.215 Consider the following examples of
state election challenge procedures, evaluated under this Mathews
prong.
i. Shortened Deadlines. The Court has made clear that fairness in
timing is a crucial element of procedural due process.216 Many states,
however, require that challenges be filed within a very short window
following the election.217 This accelerated schedule often also constricts
the periods of time for discovery, for the hearing itself, and for
appeals.218 These tight deadlines make it less likely that election
challengers will be able to adequately prepare before their hearing. If
a challenger has two business days between uncovering the election

215. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
216. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 347 (1976) (holding that a litigant must be
given “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time,’” and noting approvingly a procedure
that allowed plaintiffs to submit new evidence at any time (quotation omitted)); see also supra
note 160 (discussing notice—the lynchpin of procedural due process—and its basis in the rationale
that litigants should benefit from fairness in timing).
217. See supra Part I.A.
218. See supra Part I.
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failure and the filing deadline219—and if her hearing follows just as
quickly after filing—the timing of that hearing cannot be considered
“meaningful.”220 A litigant on that schedule has no reasonable
opportunity to investigate, conduct discovery, prepare evidence,
choose witnesses, or frame arguments. Therefore, shortened deadlines
should be seen as adding to the procedural burden on plaintiff-voters.
ii. Summary and Legislative Adjudication. The most basic “element[]
of a fair hearing” is an unbiased tribunal.221 Nevertheless, most states
leave election challenges concerning state offices to the state
legislature.222 For these challenges, the decision made by the state
legislature is the first and final decision rendered on the matter, as no
appeals process is available.223 Election challenges are inherently
political, and the result of successful challenges is usually the
replacement of a public official with someone of the opposing party.
These stakes render a state legislature a quite biased tribunal. A
Republican-controlled state house will always be incentivized to
resolve election challenges in favor of a Republican gubernatorial
candidate. A majority-Democrat legislature will always be incentivized
to resolve challenges in favor of a Democratic candidate for state
senate. The incentive to secure another seat for the political party in
power is an interest in the outcome of the case. Therefore, legislatures
and commissions comprised of legislative and executive leaders are not
“impartial and disinterested tribunal[s]” for the purposes of
adjudicating election challenges.224
Further, states often have regulations or ethical rules concerning
campaign donations to elected state judges made by litigants with cases

219. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting North Carolina’s two-day filing
deadline).
220. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” (citations omitted)).
221. Friendly, supra note 155, at 1279. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr.
Laborers Pension Trust for So. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993) (“[D]ue process requires a ‘neutral
and detached judge in the first instance’ . . . .”) (quoting Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61–62
(1972)).
222. See Douglas, Procedural Fairness, supra note 43, at 5 (“By far, the most common
mechanism states use for resolving contests for state house and senate seats is to leave the matter
to each respective house in the legislature.”).
223. See id.
224. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980).
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on their dockets.225 Legislators in these states, however, are not
prohibited from accepting campaign donations from candidates whose
fates they decide in election challenges.226 Such a biased tribunal for an
inherently partisan inquiry offends traditional notions of procedural
due process. This sort of challenge process makes decision-making less
likely to be reliable, and more likely to be based on the political party
or the well-placed financial investments—that is, campaign
contributions—of the litigants. Guaranteeing judicial processes for all
election challengers would offer the same protections already
established for ordinary civil litigants and criminal defendants alike—
ethical rules and state campaign finance regulations.
Though the alignment of judges with a particular political party is
considered by many to be a systemic ill, in cases where an election
outcome hinges on a factual dispute, judicial involvement is the lesser
evil. There is always a chance that judges will act in accordance with
their ideological preferences—whether in criminal sentencing hearings
or in claims of hate speech. The legal system, though imperfect, is
equipped with safeguards to prevent arbitrary dispute resolution.
Trials, unlike legislative votes, result in the creation of an evidentiary
record that can serve as the basis of an appeal. Trial judges are subject
to appellate review. They can be forced to provide reasoned opinions
supporting their rulings. And judges, unlike legislators, are subject to
ethical requirements that they remain independent and impartial.
Even that aspirational commitment of judges, standing alone, makes
them more likely to function as neutral, reliable decisionmakers than
state legislators, who might feel a well-intentioned duty to represent
the partisan interests of their constituents. Therefore, summary
procedures and legislative adjudication should be seen as adding to the
procedural burden on plaintiff-voters.

225. For example, the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge disqualify herself
if she “knows . . . that a party, a party’s lawyer, or the law firm of a party’s lawyer has within the
previous three years made aggregate contributions to the judge’s retention in an amount that is
greater than $50.” UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT r. 2.11(A)(4) (2016). See generally CYNTHIA
GRAY, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS. CTR. FOR JUD. ETHICS, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION BASED
ON CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS (Nov. 2016) (reporting that at least seventeen states have court
rules, rules in the judicial code of conduct, or statutes that provide for judicial disqualification
when a party has made sufficient past campaign contributions to the judge).
226. This author could not find any scholarship on the ethical implications of campaign
contributions or expenditures benefiting a state legislator who is involved in the legislative
resolution of an election challenge.
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iii. Restrictive Discovery and Evidentiary Rules. The Court has said that
fundamental fairness requires that a litigant be given “the opportunity
to be heard ‘. . . in a meaningful manner.’”227 This principle of fairness
was fleshed out in Mathews when the Court emphasized that the
plaintiff had “full access to all information relied upon by the state
agency.”228 The Court also noted that the plaintiff had been given the
opportunity “to submit additional evidence or arguments” and “to
challenge directly the accuracy of information” submitted by the state
agency.229 Judge Friendly, too, identifies elements of fairness related to
discovery and the evidentiary aspects of a proceeding. He enshrines as
traditional safeguards of due process the right to present evidence
(including the right to call witnesses), the right to know opposing
evidence, and the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses.230
When states severely circumscribe the challenger’s scope of
discovery, as in Louisiana,231 or destroy, as a matter of course, crucial
voting machine data, as in Georgia,232 a challenger loses her
“opportunity to be heard . . . ‘in a meaningful manner.’”233 A challenger
effectively has no opportunity to make proofs, raise arguments, or
challenge the state’s factual assertions if the state has exclusive
possession of information central to the alleged election failure. Such
a proceeding is less reliable because only one side of the adversarial
process has access to the determinative evidence. Without a guarantee
that relevant evidence will be preserved by the state and made
available to challengers, election challenges are not full, fair, or open
hearings. Therefore, restrictive discovery and evidentiary rules should
be seen as adding to the procedural burden on plaintiff-voters.
***
The private liberty interest at issue in election challenges is
weighty, and the potential scope of deprivation encompasses entire
voting districts. The government interests in continuing burdensome
procedures like shortened deadlines and extrajudicial decision-making
are spectacularly unconvincing when considered against a backdrop of

227. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S.
545, 552 (1965)).
228. Id. at 345–46.
229. Id. at 346.
230. See supra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
233. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552).
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modern-day election failures and public distrust in elections.
Therefore, just how burdensome a particular procedure is should be
determined by the extent to which it appears unreliable and unfair,
when considered in light of traditional due process notions and the
possible alternatives.
2. Applying Burdick: Balancing Burdens on the Right to Vote. As
discussed above, Burdick explained that equal protection claims
regarding election law—that is, claims alleging infringements on the
right to vote—should be analyzed using a balancing test: severe
burdens on the right to vote “must be narrowly drawn to advance a
state interest of compelling importance.”234 This strict standard of
review should replace the deferential treatment that state challenge
procedures have been receiving in federal court.
To appropriately calculate the magnitude of a burden on the right
to vote in electoral due process cases, federal courts should combine
the procedural burden—determined under Mathews—and any
evidence the plaintiff can offer that vote deprivation occurred. This
total burden should be considered severe under a number of fact
patterns. For instance, where a plaintiff-voter has faced a prohibitively
unmanageable state challenge process, like that in Louisiana, that
procedural burden, standing alone, is severe enough to warrant the
strictest judicial scrutiny—whether or not the plaintiff can offer
persuasive evidence that an election failure actually occurred.
Likewise, where a plaintiff has faced a state process that was only
moderately unfair—perhaps one in which discovery rules and
deadlines allowed her to adequately investigate, but in which a partisan
legislative committee rendered an unappealable decision—her burden
should be considered severe if she can also show persuasive evidence
that votes were affected.
Where the tipping point of severity is reached—by whatever
combination of procedural and actual burdens on the right to vote—
Burdick requires that the state muster a compelling interest in its
challenged policy. At this stage in the analysis, this “policy” should be
taken to encompass the election administration itself, the process the
state offers challengers, and the state’s decision not to remedy the
alleged vote deprivation. Here, as in the Mathews component of the

234. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289
(1992)).
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analysis,235 potential state interests in the procedural status quo
categorically fall short. Because the state “policy” challenged at this
stage also includes conducting a potentially faulty election, any
proposed interests feel even less compelling and are certainly less
narrowly tailored. Therefore, any burden found “severe” under this
intersectional Mathews-Burdick test should categorically be found to
fail this version of strict scrutiny. That is, in these electoral due process
cases, any severe burden—procedural, factual, or a combination
thereof—on the right to vote should be considered a per se
constitutional deprivation. Such a deprivation warrants, and indeed
compels, federal court intrusion into the political thicket for the sake
of preserving equally representative democracy.
Federal courts should enjoy flexibility in fashioning remedies to
these voting rights deprivations. As discussed above, even minimalist
rulings can incentivize improvement in state election administration
and challenge procedures. Where a federal court’s finding of a severe
burden is based more on unfair state challenge procedures than on
proof of Election Day problems, it might be more appropriate for the
court to avoid factual issues, declare a state procedure facially
unconstitutional, and require the state to rehear the plaintiff’s
challenge. Where the plaintiff’s showing of a severe burden includes
compelling factual evidence, but perhaps not a patently unfair
challenge procedure, it might be more appropriate for the federal court
to rule the election a failure, order a recount or special election, and
allow the state legislature a chance to amend any unfair procedural
rules.
CONCLUSION
Many state election codes, as they stand now, have the cumulative
effect of requiring wealth, favor with local political establishments, and
near omnipotence before a challenger can succeed in obtaining a
recount or a new election.236 The unforgiving weight of these
procedures—requirements like two-day filing deadlines,237 twentyfour-hour appeal deadlines,238 and bars to engaging in discovery239—is

235. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
236. See supra Part I.
237. See, e.g., supra note 48 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., supra note 81 and accompanying text.
239. See, e.g., supra notes 84–94 and accompanying text (discussing discovery rules for
election challenges in Louisiana).
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nearly impossible for all but the most advantaged. The magnitude of
these procedural burdens is compounded by the reality of this new
digital age; risks like election malfunctions, software irregularities, and
foreign interferences are greater now in scope and in probability. This
seems to be exactly the sort of unfairness, and exactly the sort of threat,
that federal courts are best suited to address.
If federal courts exercise greater oversight of state challenge
procedures to address severe burdens on the right to vote, federalism
will not be offended, but preserved. Federal courts asking more of state
procedure is the slightest of intrusions into the political thicket. Finding
unfairness or vote deprivation more readily would not replace state
values or state authority with federal. Instead, it would incentivize
states to innovate—to amend their own laws and to provide their own
solutions. If anything, demanding more navigable, evenhanded state
challenge procedures now would forestall even more intrusive federal
action in the future, such as through updated funding conditions on a
new HAVA rollout or through further federal investigations of state
elections.240
In addition, federal courts have traditionally valued private
attorneys general—litigants who willingly take on the expense and
effort of detecting and deterring harmful behavior in order to protect
the rights of the public through litigation.241 Private litigants who
voluntarily accept this burden in the face of potential election failures
should be supported in the doing. States should facilitate, not obstruct,
the self-funded investigations of private election challengers who could
sniff out potential software glitches or system breaches and thereby get
to the truth underlying public doubts in the election system. These
challengers, after all, have constitutional rights to fully effective votes,
and these rights extend beyond Election Day to the process of election
verification and election challenges. If a fair election challenge
ultimately reveals that the feared election failure did not impact the
results, then so much the better for public trust in election integrity.
240. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 23, at 21–22 (suggesting an administrative agency to carry out
centralized “electoral management” in the United States).
241. The D.C. Circuit observed:
Congress was well aware that “the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance” with Title II [of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964], given the obvious impossibility of the federal Government identifying and
prosecuting every violation. Indeed, . . . a private party bringing a civil rights suit “does
so not for himself alone but also as a private attorney general, vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest priority.”
Shelby Cty. v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1173, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
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There is valuable transparency to be gained through election
challenges and electoral due process claims about them. Ensuring that
challengers are afforded fair hearings will ultimately illuminate where
state election codes should be changed, when recounts are necessary,
and how our most precious right can be safeguarded.

